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Abstract. In abstract argumentation theory, many argumentation se-
mantics have been proposed for evaluating argumentation frameworks.
This paper is based on the following research question: Which seman-
tics corresponds well to what humans consider a rational judgment on
the acceptability of arguments? There are two systematic ways to ap-
proach this research question: A normative perspective is provided by
the principle-based approach, in which semantics are evaluated based on
their satisfaction of various normatively desirable principles. A descrip-
tive perspective is provided by the empirical approach, in which cognitive
studies are conducted to determine which semantics best predicts human
judgments about arguments. In this paper, we combine both approaches
to motivate a new argumentation semantics called SCF2. For this pur-
pose, we introduce and motivate two new principles and show that no
semantics from the literature satisfies both of them. We define SCF2 and
prove that it satisfies both new principles. Furthermore, we discuss find-
ings of a recent empirical cognitive study that provide additional support
to SCF2.
1 Introduction
The formal study of argumentation is an important field of research within
AI [18]. A central focus of this field has been the idea of Dung [14] that un-
der some conditions, the acceptance of arguments depends only on a so-called
attack relation among the arguments, and not on the internal structure of the
arguments. Dung called this approach abstract argumentation and called the
directed graph that represents the arguments as well as the attack relation be-
tween them an argumentation framework (AF ). Whether an argument is deemed
acceptable depends on the decision about other arguments. Therefore the basic
concept in abstract argumentation is a set of arguments that can be accepted
together, called an extension. Crucially, there may be several of such extensions,
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and these extensions may be incompatible. An extension-based argumentation
semantics takes as input an AF and produces as output a set of extensions.
Two classes of extension-based argumentation semantics have been studied.
Dung himself introduced several examples of so-called admissibility-based seman-
tics, formalizing the idea that an argument is acceptable in the context of an
extension if the extension defends the argument, i.e. attacks all the attackers
of the argument. In this paper we consider his grounded, complete, preferred,
and stable semantics. Moreover, we consider the admissibility-based semantics
known as semi-stable semantics [21,9]. The other kind of extension-based ar-
gumentation semantics are naive-based semantics, which are based on the idea
that acceptable arguments sets are specific maximal conflict-free sets. In this
paper we consider the naive, stage, CF2 and stage2 semantics and develop a
new naive-based semantics called SCF2.
Abstract argumentation has various potential applications [18], and the choice
of the semantics depends on the envisioned application. In this paper, we focus
on the following research question: Which semantics corresponds well to what
humans consider a rational judgment on the acceptability of arguments?
There are two systematic ways to approach this research question: A nor-
mative perspective is provided by the principle-based approach [3], in which
semantics are evaluated based on their satisfaction of various normatively desir-
able principles. A descriptive perspective is provided by the empirical approach
[17], in which cognitive studies are conducted to determine which semantics best
predicts human judgments about arguments. In this paper, we combine both
approaches.
Two recent empirical cognitive studies on argumentation semantics by Cramer
and Guillaume [12,13] showed CF2 to be better predictors of human argument
evaluation than admissibility-based semantics like grounded and preferred. This
finding sheds some doubt on principles that are only satisfied by admissibility-
based semantics, e.g. Admissibility, Defence and Reinstatement as defined by
van der Torre and Vesic [20]. For this reason, in this paper we focus on another
existing principle, namely Directionality, and introduce two new ones.
The first new principle we consider is Irrelevance of Necessarily Rejected
Arguments (INRA). Informally, INRA says that if an argument is attacked by
every extension of an AF, then deleting this argument should not change the
set of extensions. The idea here is that an argument that is attacked by every
extension would be rejected by any party in a debate, and hence would never be
brought up in a debate. Hence, it should be treated as if it did not even exist.
The second principle that we consider is Strong Completeness Outside Odd
Cycles (SCOOC ). Informally, SCOOC says that if an argument a and its attack-
ers are not in an odd cycle, then an extension not containing any of a’s attackers
must contain a. The principle is based on the idea that it is generally desirable
that an argument that is not attacked by any argument in a given extension
should itself be in that extension. While it is possible to ensure this property
in AFs without odd cycles, this is not the case for AFs involving an odd cycle.
The idea behind the SCOOC principle is to still satisfy this property as much as
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possible, i.e. whenever the argument under consideration and its attackers are
not in an odd cycle.
We show that of the nine common semantics mentioned above, the only ones
that satisfy INRA are grounded, complete and naive semantics, Additionally, we
show that a variant of CF2 that we call nsa(CF2) and that consists of first delet-
ing all self-attacking arguments and then applying CF2 semantics also satisfies
INRA.
Furthermore, we show that of these ten semantics (the nine mentioned at the
beginning as well as nsa(CF2)), the only one that satisfies SCOOC is the stable
semantics. But stable semantics satisfies neither Directionality nor INRA. The
fact that none of the considered existing semantics satisfies both new principles
introduced in this paper raises the question whether these two principles can be
satisfied in conjunction. We answer this question positively by defining a novel
semantics called SCF2 semantics that satisfies both of them.
Finally, we discuss findings of a recent cognitive study by Cramer and Guil-
laume [13] whose results suggest that SCF2 is more in line with the judgments
of participants than any existing semantics. So our hypothesis that SCF2 corre-
sponds well to what humans consider a rational judgment on the acceptability
of arguments is motivated not only by theoretical but also by empirical obser-
vations. The robustness of these preliminary empirical findings will need to be
tested in future studies.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we define required notions from abstract argumentation theory
[14,2]. Additionally, we define three principles from the literature on principle-
based argumentation [3,20] and present an argument for the case that the Direc-
tionality principle is a desirable property for a semantics designed to match what
humans would consider a rational judgment on the acceptability of arguments.
Definition 1. An argumentation framework (AF) F = 〈Ar, att〉 is a finite di-
rected graph in which the set Ar of vertices is considered to represent arguments
and the set att of edges is considered to represent the attack relation between
arguments, i.e. the relation between a counterargument and the argument that it
counters.
Definition 2. An att-path is a sequence 〈a0, . . . , an〉 of arguments where
(ai, ai+1) ∈ att for 0 ≤ i < n and where aj 6= ak for 0 ≤ j < k ≤ n with either
j 6= 0 or k 6= n. An odd att-cycle is an att-path 〈a0, . . . , an〉 where a0 = an and
n is odd.
Definition 3. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar. We write F |S for
the restricted AF 〈S, att ∩ (S × S)〉. The set S is called conflict-free iff there
are no arguments b, c ∈ S such that b attacks c (i.e. such that (b, c) ∈ att).
Argument a ∈ Ar is defended by S iff for every b ∈ Ar such that b attacks a
there exists c ∈ S such that c attacks b. We say that S attacks a if there exists
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b ∈ S such that b attacks a, and we define S+ = {a ∈ Ar | S attacks a} and
S− = {a ∈ Ar | a attacks some b ∈ S}.
– S is a complete extension of F iff it is conflict-free, it defends all its argu-
ments and it contains all the arguments it defends.
– S is a stable extension of F iff it is conflict-free and it attacks all the argu-
ments of Ar \ S.
– S is the grounded extension of F iff it is a minimal with respect to set
inclusion complete extension of F .
– S is a preferred extension of F iff it is a maximal with respect to set inclusion
complete extension of F .
– S is a semi-stable extension of F iff it is a complete extension and there
exists no complete extension S1 such that S ∪ S+ ⊂ S1 ∪ S
+
1 .
– S is a stage extension of F iff S is a conflict-free set and there exists no
conflict-free set S1 such that S ∪ S+ ⊂ S1 ∪ S
+
1 .
– S is a naive extension of F iff S is a maximal conflict-free set.
CF2 semantics was first introduced by Baroni et al. [4]. The idea behind it
is that we partition the AF into strongly connected components and recursively
evaluate it component by component by choosing maximal conflict-free sets in
each component and removing arguments attacked by chosen arguments. We
formally define it following the notation of Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [15]. For this we
first need some auxiliary notions:
Definition 4. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let a, b ∈ Ar. We define a ∼ b
iff either a = b or there is an att-path from a to b and there is an att-path
from b to a. The equivalence classes under the equivalence relation ∼ are called
strongly connected components (SCCs) of F . We denote the set of SCCs of F
by SCCs(F ). Given S ⊆ Ar, we define DF (S) := {b ∈ Ar | ∃a ∈ S : (a, b) ∈
att ∧ a 6∼ b}.
The simplified SCC-recursive scheme used for defining CF2 and stage2 is a
function that maps a semantics σ to another semantics scc(σ):
Definition 5. Let σ be an argumentation semantics. The argumentation seman-
tics scc(σ) is defined as follows. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar.
Then S is an scc(σ)-extension of F iff either
– |SCCs(F )| = 1 and S is a σ-extension of F , or
– |SCCs(F )| > 1 and for each C ∈ SCCs(F ), S ∩ C is an scc(σ)-extension of
F |C\DF (S).
CF2 semantics is defined to be scc(naive), and stage2 semantics is defined
to be scc(stage).
Apart from the function scc, we introduce a further function – called nsa –
that also maps a semantics to another semantics. Informally, the idea behind
nsa(σ) is that we first delete all self-attacking arguments and then apply σ. For
defining nsa formally, we first need an auxiliary definition:
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Definition 6. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF. We define the non-self-attacking
restriction of F , denoted by NSA(F ), to be the AF F |Ar′ , where Ar
′ := {a ∈
Ar | (a, a) /∈ att}.
Definition 7. Let σ be an argumentation semantics. The argumentation seman-
tics nsa(σ) is defined as follows. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let S ⊆ Ar.
We say that E is an nsa(σ)-extension of F iff E is a σ-extension of NSA(F ).
We now define the Directionality principle introduced by Baroni and Gia-
comin [3]. For this, we first need an auxiliary notion:
Definition 8. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF. A set U ⊆ Ar is unattacked iff there
exists no a ∈ Ar \ U such that a attacks some b ∈ U .
Definition 9. A semantics σ satisfies the Directionality principle iff for every
AF F and every unattacked set U , it holds that σ(F |U ) = {E ∩ U | E ∈ σ(F )}.
The Directionality principle corresponds to an important feature of the hu-
man practice of argumentation, namely that if a person has formed an opinion
on some arguments and is confronted with new arguments, they will only feel
compelled to reconsider their judgment on the prior arguments if one of the new
arguments attacks one of the prior arguments. Apart from our own intuition, we
can also refer to the results of an empirical cognitive study on argumentation
that shows that humans are able to systematically judge the directionality of
attacks between arguments [11]. Thus we consider the Directionality principle
crucial for the goal that we focus on in this paper.
3 Two New Principles
The first new principle we consider is Irrelevance of Necessarily Rejected Argu-
ments (INRA). Informally, INRA says that if an argument is attacked by every
extension of an AF, then deleting this argument should not change the set of
extensions. The idea here is that an argument that is attacked by every extension
would not be held by any party, and hence would never be brought forwards in
a debate. Hence, it should be treated as if it did not even exist.
In order to formally define the INRA principle, we first need to define a
notation for an AF with one argument deleted:
Definition 10. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let a ∈ Ar be an argument.
Then F−a denotes the restricted AF F |Ar\{a}.
Definition 11. Let σ be an argumentation semantics. We say that σ satisfies
Irrelevance of Necessarily Rejected Arguments ( INRA) iff for every AF F =
〈Ar, att〉 and every argument a ∈ Ar, if every E ∈ σ(F ) attacks a, then σ(F ) =
σ(F−a).
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The second principle that we consider is Strong Completeness Outside Odd
Cycles (SCOOC ). Informally, SCOOC says that if an argument a and its attack-
ers are not in an odd cycle, then an extension not containing any of a’s attackers
must contain a.
In order to formally define the Strong Completeness Outside Odd Cycles
principle, we first need to define the auxiliary notion of a set of arguments being
strongly complete outside odd cycles.
Definition 12. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let A ⊆ Ar. We say that A
is strongly complete outside odd cycles iff for every argument a ∈ Ar, if no
argument in {a} ∪ {a}− is in an odd att-cycle and A ∩ {a}− = ∅, then a ∈ A.
Definition 13. Let σ be an argumentation semantics. We say that σ satisfies
Strong Completeness Outside Odd Cycles (SCOOC) iff for any AF F , every
σ-extension of F is strongly complete outside odd cycles.
The SCOOC principle is related to the property of strong completeness : An
extension E is strongly complete iff every argument not attacked by E is in E. We
call this property strong completeness as it is a strengthening of completeness,
which states that every argument defended by E is in E.
The stable semantics is the only widely studied argumentation semantics
that satisfies strong completeness. More precisely, the stable semantics can be
characterized by the conjunction of conflict-freeness and strong completeness. In
other words, one can say that the stable semantics is motivated by the idea that
a violation of strong completeness constitutes a paradox and should therefore be
avoided.
The stable semantics satisfies strong completeness at the price of allowing
for situations in which there are no extensions and hence no judgment can be
made on any argument whatsoever. Such cases are always due to odd att-cycles.
So we can say that odd att-cycles – unless resolved through arguments attacking
the odd cycle – cause paradoxical situations. The idea of most semantics other
than stable semantics is to somehow contain these paradoxes so that they do not
affect our ability to make judgments about completely or sufficiently unrelated
arguments.
The idea of the SCOOC principle is that while in odd cycles we may not be
able to avoid a paradoxical judgments about the arguments, i.e. a judgment in
which an argument is not accepted even though none of its attackers is accepted,
such paradoxical judgments should be completely avoided outside of odd cycles.
How does that differ from the containment of paradoxical situations provided
by existing semantics? Admissibility-based semantics do not allow for any judg-
ment about an argument in an unattacked odd cycle; however this undecided
status is not limited to odd cycles, but carries forward to arguments that are
not in an odd cycle but that are att-reachable from an odd cycle.
Naive-based semantics like CF2, stage and stage2 allow for judgments about
arguments in an unattacked odd cycle, but also at the cost of affecting the way
arguments that are not in odd cycles are interpreted. For example, CF2 allows
for a six-cycle to be interpreted in a doubly paradoxical way despite the fact
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that it is an even cycle that can be interpreted in a non-paradoxical manner
(see Figure 4 below). This behavior of CF2 was also considered problematic by
Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [15], who used this example to motivate their stage2 seman-
tics, but as we will show in Figure 6 below, stage2 also fails to avoid paradoxical
judgments about arguments that are not themselves involved in an odd cycle.
The SCOOC principle was designed to systematically identify whether a
semantics suffers from this problem. As it turns out, all the standard semantics
other than stable do suffer from the problem, i.e. do not satisfy SCOOC.
We will now look at which semantics satisfy or do not satisfy each of the two
principles that we have defined.
Theorem 1. The grounded, complete, naive and nsa(CF2) semantics satisfy
INRA.
Before we can prove this theorem, we first need some auxiliary definitions
and lemmas.
Definition 14. A semantics σ is called SCC-rich iff for every AF F = 〈Ar, att〉
such that |SCCs(F )| = 1 and every argument a ∈ Ar, there is an extension
E ∈ σ(F ) such that E does not attack a.
Definition 15. A semantics is called semi-rich iff for every AF F = 〈Ar, att〉
and every argument a ∈ Ar such that (a, a) /∈ att, there is an extension E ∈ σ(F )
such that E does not attack a.
Definition 16. A semantics is called SCC-semi-rich iff for every AF F =
〈Ar, att〉 such that |SCCs(F )| = 1 and every argument a ∈ Ar such that (a, a) /∈
att, there is an extension E ∈ σ(F ) such that E does not attack a.
Lemma 1. Naive semantics is semi-rich and thus also SCC-semi-rich.
Proof. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let a ∈ Ar be an argument such that
(a, a) /∈ att. Then {a} is a conflict-free set, so there is some maximal conflict-free
set E ⊇ {a}. Then E is a naive extenstion of F that does not attack a. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Grounded and complete semantics are SCC-rich.
Proof. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF such that |SCCs(F )| = 1 and let a ∈ Ar. We
distinguish two cases:
(a) att = ∅. In this case Ar is the only grounded and complete extension of F ,
and Ar does not attack a.
(b) att 6= ∅. Since |SCCs(F )| = 1, this implies that every argument is attacked
by some argument. Thus ∅ is a grounded and complete extension of F . Since
∅ does not attack a, the required condition is satisfied. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let σ be an SCC-rich or SCC-semi-rich semantics.
(a) If σ is SCC-rich, then scc(σ) satisfies INRA.
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(b) If σ is SCC-semi-rich, then nsa(scc(σ)) satisfies INRA.
Proof. Before we provide the long technical proof of this lemma, we first sketch
the proof idea.
First we observe that for showing that nsa(scc(σ)) satisfies INRA, it is
enough to consider AFs without self-attacking arguments. But in such AFs,
SCC-richness and SCC-semi-richness coincide. So we can actually assume SCC-
richness for both parts of the lemma.
We consider an argument a that is attacked by every extension and need to
show that removing that argument from the AF will not result in the emergence
of new extensions or the disappearance of any previous extensions. Due to the
SCC-richness of σ, a cannot be in an initial SCC. Instead, a must be in a posi-
tion where, whatever happens in the SCCs that come before a, some argument
attacking a will be accepted. Thus the SCC-recursive scheme removes a from
the computation of the semantics at that step. Since that is the case, removing
a from the AF will make no difference, because what happens in the SCCs that
preceed a will not be affected by the initial removal of a, and starting at the SCC
that (originally) contains a, it makes no difference whether a is initially removed
from the framework or removed from the computation by the SCC-recursive
scheme due to having an attacker from a previous SCC.
The main difficulty in making this proof sketch a rigorous proof is that the
removal of amay change the structure of the SCCs, as the SCC containing a may
be split up into multiple SCCs. That complicates the argument significantly. We
now show how this case can be covered in the full proof that follows.
We first prove part (a) of this lemma and then show how the proof can be
adapted to prove part (B).
Let σ be an SCC-rich semantics. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let a ∈ Ar
be an argument such that for every E ∈ scc(σ)(F ), E attacks a. We need to
show that scc(σ)(F ) = scc(σ)(F−a).
Note that F must have more than one SCC, because otherwise the SCC-
richness of σ would imply that there is an extension that does not attack a. We
now distinguish two cases:
Case (i): |SCCs(F−a)| = 1. In this case, F has two SCCs, namely {a} and
Ar \ {a}. Since a is attacked by every extension, it must be attacked from some
argument in Ar\{a}, so a does not attack any argument in Ar\{a}. So Ar\{a} is
the initial SCC of F and every extension of F−a contains an argument attacking
a. So scc(σ)(F−a) = σ(F−a) = scc(σ)(F ).
Case (ii): |SCCs(F−a)| > 1. In this case, we prove the result by an induction
over the number of arguments in F , so we may assume as induction hypothesis
that it holds for strict subframeworks of F . Let Ca denote the SCC of F that
contains a.
First we show that scc(σ)(F ) ⊆ scc(σ)(F−a). Let S ∈ scc(σ)(F ). Let C ∈
SCCs(F ). Since |SCCs(F )| > 1, it follows by Definition 5 that S ∩ C is an
scc(σ)-extension of F |C\DF (S). By the induction hypothesis, S ∩C is an scc(σ)-
extension of F |C\(DF (S)∪{a}). So we have established that for each C ∈ SCCs(F ),
S ∩ C is an scc(σ)-extension of F |C\(DF (S)∪{a}) (1).
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We need to show that S ∈ scc(σ)(F−a). Let C′ ∈ SCCs(F−a). By Definition
5 and the fact that |SCCs(F−a)| > 1, it is enough to show that this arbitrarily
chosen C′ ∈ SCCs(F−a) satisfies the following property:
(*) S ∩ C′ is an scc(σ)-extension of F−a|C′\DF
−a
(S).
Note that either C′ ∈ SCCs(F ) or that C′ ⊆ Ca. We consider these two cases
separately.
If C′ ∈ SCCs(F ), then F−a|C \DF−a(S) = F |C\(DF (S)∪{a}), so the required
property (*) directly follows from (1).
If C′ ⊆ Ca, we show (*) by making the case distinction from the definition
of scc(σ):
Case 1: |SCCs(F |Ca \ (DF (S) ∪ {a}))| = 1. Then |SCCs(F−a|Ca)| = 1, so the
single SCC of F |Ca \ (DF (S)∪{a}) must either be fully contained in C
′
or disjoint from C′. In the first case, C′ = Ca \ {a}, so S ∩C′ = S ∩Ca
F |Ca \ (DF (S) ∪ {a}) = F−a|C′ \DF−a(S). Therefore (1) applied to Ca
implies that property (*) holds. In the second case, C′ ⊆ DF−a(S) and
S ∩ C′ = ∅, so (*) holds because the empty set is a scc(σ)-extension of
the empty framework.
Case 2: |SCCs(F |Ca \ (DF (S)∪ {a}))| > 1. Then by Definition 5, for each C
∗ ∈
SCCs(F |Ca \ (DF (S) ∪ {a})), S ∩ C
∗ is an scc(σ)-extension of F |C∗ \
DF |Ca\(DF (S)∪{a})(S). Let C
′′ ∈ SCCs(F |C′ \ DF (S)) (2). Then C′′ ∈
SCCs(F |Ca \ (DF (S)∪ {a})), because F |C′ \DF (S) ⊆ F |Ca \ (DF (S)∪
{a}) (note that C′′ cannot be expanded to a larger SCC in F |Ca \
(DF (S) ∪ {a}), because C′ is an SCC of F and would therefore have
to contain this expansion of C′′). Now (2) together with Definition 5
implies property (*).
This concludes the proof that S ∈ scc(σ)(F−a) and thus that scc(σ)(F ) ⊆
scc(σ)(F−a) The proof that scc(σ)(F−a) ⊆ scc(σ)(F ) works similarly.
The main part of the proof of part (b) works similarly, but the beginning is
a bit different:
Let σ be an SCC-semi-rich semantics. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF and let
a ∈ Ar be an argument such that for every E ∈ nsa(scc(σ))(F ), a /∈ E. We
need to show that nsa(scc(σ))(F ) = nsa(scc(σ))(F−a). Define F
′ := NSA(F ).
We need to show that scc(σ)(F ) = scc(σ)(F−a). If a is not an argument in F
′,
then the result trivially holds. So suppose a is in F ′. Note that F ′ must have
more than one SCC, because otherwise the SCC-semi-richness of σ would imply
that there is an extension that does not attack a.
Now we continue as in the proof of part (a), just with F ′ in place of F . ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 and the fact that grounded =
scc(grounded), complete = scc(complete) and nsa(CF2) = nsa(scc(naive)), it
directly follows that grounded, complete and nsa(CF2) satisfy INRA.
We now show that naive semantics satisfies INRA. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be
an AF and let a ∈ Ar be an argument such that for every E ∈ naive(F ), E
attacks a. By the semi-richness of the naive semantics (Lemma 1), it follows
that (a, a) ∈ att.
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We need to show that naive(F ) = naive(F−a). Let S ∈ naive(F ). As a /∈ S,
S ⊆ Ar \ {a}. S is conflict-free, and as S is maximal with this property in F , it
is also maximal with this property in F−a. So S ∈ naive(F−a), as required.
Now let S ∈ naive(F−a). S is conflict-free. Since (a, a) ∈ att, S ∪ {a} is not
conflict-free. Together with the maximality of S in F−a, this implies that S is a
maximally conflict-free subset of Ar, i.e. S ∈ naive(F ), as required. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2. Stable, preferred, semi-stable, stage, stage2 and CF2 semantics
violate INRA.
Proof. A counterexample for stable, preferred, semi-stable, stage and stage2 se-
mantics is in Figure 1. A counterexample for CF2 semantics is in Figure 2. ⊓⊔
a b
c
Fig. 1. Stable, preferred, semi-stable, stage and stage2 semantics violate INRA, since
the only extension {a} attacks b, but removing b yields an additional extension, namely
{c}.
a b
c
Fig. 2. CF2 semantics violates INRA, since both extension ({a} and {b}) attack c, but
after removing c, {b} is no longer an extension.
Theorem 3. Stable semantics satisfies SCOOC.
Proof. Consider an AF F , a stable extension E of F and an argument a ∈ Ar,
such that E ∩ {a}− = ∅. Then by definition of stable semantics we have a ∈ E.
Consequently, E is strongly complete, and in particular E is strongly complete
outside odd cycles. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. Complete, grounded, preferred, semi-stable, naive, stage, CF2, stage2
and nsa(CF2) semantics violate SCOOC.
Proof. A counterexample of complete, grounded, preferred and semi-stable is
in Figure 3, a counterexample for naive, CF2 and nsa(CF2) is in Figure 4, a
counterexample for naive and stage is in Figure 5, and a counterexample for
stage2 is in Figure 6. ⊓⊔
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a b c
Fig. 3. Complete, grounded, preferred and semi-stable semantics violate SCOOC, since
E = {} is an extension but E is not strongly complete outside odd cycles: b and c are
not in an odd cycle, {c}− = {b}, but E does not contain c.
a b c
def
Fig. 4. Naive, CF2 and nsa(CF2) semantics violate SCOOC, since E = {a, d} is an
extension but E is not strongly complete outside odd cycles: b and c are not in an odd
cycle, {c}− = {b}, but E does not contain c.
a b c
Fig. 5. Stage and naive semantics violate SCOOC, since E = {b} is an extension but
E is not strongly complete outside odd cycles: a is not in an odd cycle, {a}− = {}, but
E does not contain a.
a b c
def
Fig. 6. Stage2 semantics violates SCOOC, since E = {a, d} is an extension but E is
not strongly complete outside odd cycles: b and c are not in an odd cycle, {c}− = {b},
but E does not contain c.
4 SCF2 Semantics
In this section, we define and study the new semantics SCF2, which satisfies
both of the new principles introduced in the previous section as well as the Di-
rectionality principle defined in the preliminaries. Furthermore, we will motivate
the design choices in the definition of SCF2 by looking at how semantics defined
in a similar way as SCF2 fail to satisfy at least one of Directionality, INRA or
SCOOC.
We have seen in the previous section that nsa(CF2) satisfies INRA but does
not satisfy SCOOC. The idea behind the definition of SCF2 is that we modify
the definition of nsa(CF2) by already enforcing SCOOC at the level of the single
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SCCs considered in the SCC-recursive definition of nsa(CF2). For this, we define
a variant of naive semantics called SCOOC-naive semantics.
Definition 17. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF, and let A ⊆ Ar. We say that A is
an SCOOC-naive extension of F if A is subset-maximal among the conflict-free
subsets of Ar that are strongly complete outside odd cycles.
Recall that CF2 is defined to be scc(naive), i.e. nsa(CF2) = nsa(scc(naive)).
For defining SCF2, we just replace naive semantics by SCOOC-naive semantics
in this definition.
Definition 18. SCF2 semantics is defined to be nsa(scc(SCOOC-naive)).
In other words, SCF2 works by first deleting all self-attacking arguments
and then applying the SCC-recursive scheme that is also used in the definition
of CF2, but applying SCOOC-naive semantics instead of naive semantics to each
single SCC.
As we will show below, SCF2 satisfies Directionality, INRA and SCOOC,
which we have argued to be desirable principles when evaluating a semantics
designed to correspond well to what humans would consider a rational judgment
on the acceptability of arguments. The somewhat complex definition of SCF2
raises the question whether a simpler definition could also be enough to satisfy
these three principles.
To approach this question systematically, we would like to point out that the
definition of SCF2 contains three features that distinguishes it from naive seman-
tics: It starts by deleting all self-attacking arguments (the function nsa), it pro-
ceeds by applying the SCC-recursive scheme (the function scc), and within each
SCC, it applies SCOOC-naive rather than naive semantics. If we consider each
of these three features a switch that we can switch on or off, we have eight defini-
tions of semantics, namely naive, nsa(naive), SCOOC-naive, nsa(SCOOC-naive),
scc(naive), nsa(scc(naive)), scc(SCOOC-naive) and nsa(scc(SCOOC-naive)). One
can easily see that naive = nsa(naive), so these eight definitions define only seven
different semantics, whose properties we now study in order to show that only
SCF2 satisfies all three principles Directionality, INRA and SCOOC.
Table 1 shows which of these seven semantics satisfies which of these three
principles (we use the standard name CF2 for scc(naive) and use the short name
SCF2 to refer to nsa(scc(SCOOC-naive))). Note that SCF2 satisfies all three
principles, while no other of these seven semantics satisfies all three principles.
For the rest of this section, we will prove the results depicted in Table 1 as
well as the theorem that every AF has an SCF2 extension. In order to prove
properties about SCF2, we first need another lemma.
Lemma 4. SCOOC-naive semantics is SCC-semi-rich.
Proof. Let F = 〈Ar, att〉 be an AF such that |SCCs(F ) = 1| and let c ∈ Ar be
an argument such that (c, c) /∈ att. We prove the lemma by induction over |Ar|,
so we assume for the inductive hypothesis that it holds for strict subframeworks
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Directionality INRA SCOOC
naive = nsa(naive) × X ×
SCOOC-naive × × X
nsa(SCOOC-naive) × × X
CF2 X × ×
nsa(CF2) X X ×
scc(SCOOC-naive) X × X
SCF2 X X X
Table 1. Properties of SCF2 and six semantics that are related to it with respect the
three principles considered in this paper
of F . We need to find an SCF2-extension E of F such that E does not attack
c. We do this by specifying a non-deterministic procedure to construct such an
extension. The constructed extension will be constructed in such a way that it
must contain c, which implies that it does not attack c.
At each step k of the procedure, we identify a set Ek of arguments to be
included in E and a set E¯k of arguments for which we rule out that they may be
in E. We define Uk to be set of arguments a such that it is not yet determined
by step k whether a is included in E or not; formally, Uk := Ar\
⋃
i<k(Ek ∪ E¯k).
We set E¯0 := {a ∈ Ar | (a, a) ∈ att} and E0 := {c}. Let k > 0. We set
E¯k := {a ∈ Ar | some argument in Ek−1 attacks a or is attacked by a}. For the
definition of Ek we have a case-distinction:
1. If Ek−1 6= ∅, we define Ek := E1k ∪E
2
k, where E
1
k := {a ∈ Uk | all attakers of
a are in some E¯i for i < k}, and E2k := {a ∈ Uk | for some b ∈ E¯k−1 that is
not in an odd cycle and whose attackers are not in an odd cycle and not in
any Ei for i < k, a attacks b}.
2. If Ek−1 = ∅ and Uk 6= ∅, we set Ek to be a SCOOC-naive extension of an
unattacked SCC of Uk (which exists and is non-empty by inductive hypoth-
esis and by the fact that Uk does not contain self-attacking arguments, as
these are all in E¯0).
3. If Ek−1 = ∅ and Uk = ∅, the procedure stops.
When the procedure stops at step k, we set E to be the union of all Ei for
i < k. Note that once case 2 is applied, only case 2 can be applied. Let n denote
the step at which case 2 is first applied. Note that a simple proof by induction
establishes that whenever a ∈ E2k for k < n, then there is an even-length path
from a to c (1). This can be generalized to the statement that whenever a ∈ Ek
for k < n, there are a′, k′ such that a′ ∈ E¯k′ and there is an odd-length att-path
from a′ to c and from a′ to a (2).
a ∈ E because a ∈ E0. It is easy to see from the construction of E that E is
strongly complete outside odd cycles and that adding an argument to E creates
a conflict within E. So all we still need to prove is that E is conflict-free. Suppose
for a contradiction that (a1, a2) ∈ att for a1, a2 ∈ E. From the definition of E¯k
for k > 0 it follows that there is an i such that a1, a2 ∈ Ei. Clearly this is not
the case if Ei was defined according to case 2 of the definition of Ek, so k < n.
By the definition of E1k, it furthermore follows that a2 /∈ E
1
i . So a2 ∈ E
2
i , i.e. by
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property (1) there is an even-length att-path p0 from a2 to c. Furthermore, by
property (2) there is an a′1 such that there is an odd-length att-path p1 from a
′
1
to c and from a′1 to a1. Since |SCCs(F ) = 1|, there is a path p2 from a2 to a
′
1.
The length of path p2 must be even, because if it were odd, then concatenating
p2 with the odd-length path p1 and the attack from a1 to a2 would result in an
odd cycle through a2, which cannot exist as a2 ∈ E2i . Since |SCCs(F ) = 1|, there
is a path p3 from c to a2. If the length of p3 is odd, then p3 concatenated with the
even-length path p0 is an odd cycle through a2. If the length of p3 is even, the
p3 concatenated with the even-length path p2 and the attack from a
′
1 to c is an
odd cycle through a2. so in either case, there is an odd cycle through a2, which
contradicts the fact that a2 ∈ E
2
i . This completes our proof by contradiction
that E is conflict-free. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. Every AF has at least one SCF2 extension.
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that every single-SCC AF has a SCOOC-naive exten-
sion. This together with the definition of the SCC recursive scheme implies that
every AF has at least one scc(SCOOC-naive)-extension, and hence at least one
SCF2 extension. ⊓⊔
We now prove the properties of SCF2 listed in Table 1.
Theorem 6. SCF2 satisfies Directionality.
Proof. Consider an AF F and an unattacked set U . Define F ′ = (Ar′, att′) to
be NSA(F ). Note that U is unattacked in F ′ and that therefore SCCs(F ′) =
SCCs(F ′|U ) ∪ SCCs(F ′|Ar′\U ) (1).
First, we show that if E1 ∈ SCF2(F |U ) then there exists E2 ∈ SCF2(F ) such
that E1 = E2∩U . AssumeE1 ∈ SCF2(F |U ). ThenE1 ∈ scc(SCOOC-naive)(F
′|U ),
i.e. for each C ∈ SCCs(F ′|U ), E1 ∩ C is an scc(SCOOC-naive)-extension of
F ′|C \ DF ′(E1) (2). By Theorem 5, F ′Ar\U \ DF
′(E1) has an SCF2 extension,
say E. Define E2 := E1∪E. Note that E1 = E2∩U , so it is enough to show that
E2 is an SCF2-extension of F . Since F
′ = NSA(F ′), E is an scc(SCOOC-naive)-
extension of F ′Ar\U \ DF
′(E1), i.e. for each C ∈ SCCs(F ′|Ar\U ), E ∩ C is an
scc(SCOOC-naive)-extension of F ′|C \DF ′(E). This together with (1) and (2)
implies that E2 is an scc(SCOOC-naive)-extension of F
′, i.e. that E2 is an SCF2-
extension of F , as required.
Now, we show that if E ∈ SCF2(F ) then E ∩ U ∈ SCF2(F |U ). Assume
E ∈ SCF2(F ). Then for each C ∈ SCCs(F ′), E ∩ C is an scc(SCOOC-naive)-
extension of F ′|C \DF (A). By (1), it follows that E∩U is an scc(SCOOC-naive)-
extension of F ′, i.e. that E ∩ U is an SCF2-extension of F , as required. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. SCF2 satisfies SCOOC.
Proof. Consider an AF F , an SCF2 extension E of F and an argument a ∈ Ar
such that no argument in {a} ∪ a− is in an odd cycle and E ∩ a− = ∅. Then by
definition of SCF2 semantics, the moment the SCOOC-naive function is applied
to a sub-framework of F containing a, we have a ∈ E. Consequently,E is strongly
complete outside odd cycles. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 8. SCF2 satisfies INRA.
Proof. By Lemma 4, SCOOC-naive semantics is SCC-semi-rich. So by Lemma
3 and the definition of SCF2 it follows that SCF2 satisfies INRA. ⊓⊔
Next we establish the remaining positive results from Table 1.
Theorem 9. CF2, nsa(CF2) and scc(SCOOC-naive) satisfy Directionality.
Proof. The result for CF2 has been shown by Baroni and Giacomin [3] and
directly implies the result for nsa(CF2). The proof for scc(SCOOC-naive) works
just like the proof that SCF2 satisfies Directionality (Theorem 6). ⊓⊔
Theorem 10. SCOOC-naive, nsa(SCOOC-naive) and scc(SCOOC-naive) sat-
isfy SCOOC.
Proof. For SCOOC-naive and nsa(SCOOC-naive), this follows directly from the
definitions. As for scc(SCOOC-naive), the proof that SCF2 satisfies SCOOC
(Theorem 7) also establishes that scc(SCOOC-naive) satisfies SCOOC. ⊓⊔
We now prove the negative results shown in Table 1 (ommiting the ones that
are already covered by Theorems 2 and 4).
Theorem 11. Naive semantics violates Directionality.
Proof. A counterexample is shown in Figure 7.
a b
Fig. 7. Naive semantics violates Directionality, because a is not in the extension {b},
even though it is in the only extension of the unattacked subframework induced by
{a}.
Theorem 12. SCOOC-naive semantics violates Directionality and INRA.
Proof. A counterexample to both principles is shown in Figure 8.
Theorem 13. nsa(SCOOC-naive) semantics violates Directionality and INRA.
Proof. A counterexample to Directionality is shown in Figure 9. A counterex-
ample to INRA is shown in Figure 10.
Theorem 14. scc(SCOOC-naive) semantics violates INRA.
Proof. A counterexample is shown in Figure 11.
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ba c d
Fig. 8. SCOOC-naive semantics violates Directionality, because c is not in the exten-
sion {a, d}, even though it is in the only extension of the unattacked subframework
induced by {a, b, c}. SCOOC-naive semantics violates INRA, because b is attacked by
both extensions ({a, c} and {a, d}) and the extension {a, d} is not an extension of the
subframework induced by {a, c, d}.
c d e
a
b
Fig. 9. nsa(SCOOC-naive) semantics violates Directionality, because {b, e} is an ex-
tension, even though {b} is not an extension of the unattacked subframework induced
by {a, b, c, d}.
a b
c
d
Fig. 10. nsa(SCOOC-naive) semantics violates INRA, because b is attacked by every
extension and the extension {a, d} is not an extension of the subframework induced by
{a, c, d}.
a
b
c
Fig. 11. scc(SCOOC-naive) semantics violates INRA because a is attacked by every
extension and the extension {c} is not an extension of the subframework induced by
{b, c}.
5 Empirical cognitive studies
Rahwan et al. [18] argue that Artificial Intelligence research will benefit from the
interplay between logic and cognition and that therefore “logicians and computer
scientists ought to give serious attention to cognitive plausibility when assess-
SCF2 – an Argumentation Semantics for Rational Human Judgments 17
ing formal models of reasoning, argumentation, and decision making”. Based on
the observation that in the previous literature on formal argumentation theory,
an example-based approach and a principle-based approach were used to moti-
vate and validate argumentation semantics, they propose to complement these
approaches by an experiment-based approach that takes into account empirical
cognitive studies on how humans interpret and evaluate arguments. They made
a first contribution to this new approach by presenting and discussing the results
of two such studies that they conducted in order to test the cognitive plausibility
of simple and floating reinstatement [18].
While the argumentation frameworks used in Rahwan et al.’s studies could
not distinguish between preferred semantics and naive-based semantics like CF2,
two more recent studies by Cramer and Guillaume [12,13] address this issue.
Both of these studies made use of a group discussion methodology that is known
to stimulate more rational thinking. According to the results of the first study
[12], CF2, SCF2, stage and stage2 semantics are significantly better predictors
for human judgments on the acceptability of arguments than admissibility-based
semantics like grounded, preferred, complete or semi-stable (binomial tests, all p-
values < 0.001). However, this study did not involve argumentation frameworks
that allow to distinguish between CF2, SCF2, stage and stage2 semantics.
According to the results of Cramer and Guillaume’s second study [13], SCF2,
CF2 and grounded semantics are better predictors for human judgments on the
acceptability of arguments than stage, stage2, preferred or semi-stable semantics
(binomial tests, all p-values< 0.001). Additionally, the results suggest that SCF2
is a better predictor than CF2 and grounded semantics, but the results for that
are not significant. We will now explain these results in more depth.
As explained in Section 3, Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [15] critique a feature of CF2
semantics, namely that in the case of a six-cycle as depicted in Figure 4, CF2
allows two opposite arguments (e.g. a and d) to be accepted together. The second
study by Cramer and Guillaume [13] confirms that this criticism is in line with
human judgments of argument acceptability. We briefly summarize the data
on which this judgment is made (a more detailed explanation can by found in
[13]): Based on the overall responses of the participants in the study, Cramer
and Guillaume point out that 12 of the 61 participants of their study have
a high frequency of incoherent responses, so that they disconsider them from
the further analysis. Among the remaining 49 participants, 22 follow a simple
cognitive strategy of marking arguments as Undecided whenever there is a reason
for doubt (in line with the grounded semantics), while 27 participants do not
follow this strategy. Cramer and Guillaume call these 27 participants the coherent
non-grounded participants.
In the case of 11 out of the 12 argumentation frameworks considered in the
study, the majority of these 27 coherent non-grounded participants make judge-
ments that are in line with CF2 semantics. The only exception to this is an
argumentation framework involving a six-cycle, in which only 33% of the coher-
ent non-grounded participants make a judgement in line with CF2 semantics,
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while 60% make a judgements that is in line with SCF2, stage2, preferred and
semi-stable semantics.
Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [15] themselves had used this criticism against CF2 to
motivate their stage2 semantics, but in the study by Cramer and Guillaume
[13], stage2 performed significantly worse than SCF2, since all five arguments
in the only AF on which stage2 and SCF2 differed were evaluated by most
participants (including most coherent non-grounded participants) in line with
SCF2 rather than with stage2.
In combination with the principle-based argument for SCF2 presented in the
previous two sections, these preliminary findings provide additional support for
our hypothesis that SCF2 corresponds well to what humans consider a rational
judgment on the acceptability of arguments.
6 Related work
In the previous section we have already considered related empirical work. In
this section we focus on work related to the principle-based approach to abstract
argumentation that we have employed in this paper.
The principle-based analysis of argumentation semantics was initiated by Ba-
roni and Giacomin [3] to choose among the many extension-based argumentation
semantics that have been proposed in the formal argumentation literature. The
handbook chapter of van der Torre and Vesic [20] gives a classification of fifteen
alternatives for argumentation semantics using twenty-seven principles discussed
in the literature on abstract argumentation. Dvorˇa´k and Gaggl [15] introduce
stage2 semantics by showing how it satisfies various desirable properties, simi-
larly to how we motivate SCF2 semantics in this paper.
Moreover, additional extension-based argumentation semantics and princi-
ples have been proposed by various authors. For example, Besnard et al. [6]
introduce a system for specifying semantics in abstract argumentation called
SESAME. Moreover, many principles have been proposed for alternative seman-
tics of argumentation frameworks such as ranking semantics [1], and for extended
argumentation frameworks, for example for abstract dialectical frameworks [8].
The principle of Irrelevance of Necessarily Rejected Arguments is closely re-
lated to the well-studied area of dynamics of argumentation, in which also various
principles have been proposed which are closely related to INRA. Cayrol et al.
[10] were maybe the first to study revision of frameworks using a principle-based
analysis, and they have been related to notions of equivalence [5,16]. Boella et al.
[7] define principles for abstracting (i.e., removing) an argument, and Rienstra
et al. [19] define a variety of persistence and monotony properties for argumen-
tation semantics. Our INRA principle is inspired by and closely related to the
skeptical IO monotony principle that they define. The difference is that their
principle considers adding an attack rather than removing an argument.
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7 Conclusion and Future Work
Motivated by empirical cognitive studies on argumentation semantics, we have
introduced a new naive-based argumentation semantics called SCF2. A principle-
based analysis shows that it has two distinguishing features:
1. If an argument is attacked by all extensions, then it can never be used in a
dialogue and therefore it has no effect on the acceptance of other arguments.
We call it Irrelevance of Necessarily Rejected Arguments.
2. Within each extension, if none of the attackers of an argument is accepted
and the argument is not involved in a paradoxical relation, then the argument
is accepted. We define paradoxicality as being part of an odd cycle, and we
call this principle Strong Completeness Outside Odd Cycles.
We have argued that these features together with the findings from empirical
cognitive studies make SCF2 a good candidate for an argumentation semantics
that corresponds well to what humans consider a rational judgment on the ac-
ceptability of arguments.
The empirical approach to abstract argumentation theory is still a relatively
new approach that needs to be developed further by modifying and improving
the methodology of existing studies in the design of future studies. The current
paper provides a well-motivated hypothesis that can be tested more rigorously
in future empirical studies, namely the hypothesis that SCF2 predicts human
judgments on the acceptability of arguments better than other abstract argu-
mentation semantics.
On the theoretical side, more work is required to determine which other
principles studied in the literature are satisfied by SCF2. Moreover, dialogue-
based decision procedures must be defined, and the complexity of the various
decision problems must be established. Finally, an extension towards structured
argumentation should be investigated.
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